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FROM TARSKI TO GO¨DEL
OR, HOW TO DERIVE THE SECOND INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM
FROM THE UNDEFINABILITY OF TRUTH WITHOUT SELF-REFERENCE
ALBERT VISSER
Abstract. In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof
of the Second Incompleteness Theorem from Tarski’s Theorem of the Undefin-
ability of Truth.
1. Prelude
Self-reference is a great and beautiful thing, but it may be interesting to see
what one can do without it. In this paper, we provide a self-reference-free proof of
the Second Incompleteness Theorem from Tarski’s Theorem of the Undefinability
of Truth. Thus, we at least reduce the self-referential arguments needed for the
Second Incompleteness Theorem and Tarski’s Theorem of the Undefinability of
Truth taken together.
We take self-reference, in this paper, as broadly as possible. There are all kind
of subtle discussions that we wish to side-step: are Yablo-style constructions self-
reference? does the Grelling paradox involve true self-reference? etcetera. We want
to avoid even the slightest smell of diagonalization, self-reference, the recursion
theorem, circularity or majorization.
1.1. Motivation. Why is a proof of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem from
Tarski’s Theorem interesting? Our result is a step in a program to find self-
reference-free proofs both of the Second Incompleteness Theorem and of Tarski’s
Theorem. I do not think there are, at present, convincing self-reference-free proofs
—at least, not in the very broad sense of self-reference discussed above— of ei-
ther the Second Incompleteness Theorem or of Tarski’s Theorem. There is a self-
reference-free proof, due to Kotlarski, of Tarski’s Theorem for the case of Uniform
Biconditionals. See [Kot04]. However, Kotlarski’s attempted proof for non-uniform
biconditionals fails. Moreover, Kotlarski’s proof uses majorization which could be
viewed as a form of diagonalization.
Why is the quest for a self-reference-free proof of these two great theorems im-
portant? Well, first there is the ‘because the question is there’ argument. It is
always annoying when we have in essence just one kind of proof of a great theo-
rem. Secondly, a different proof may lead to new generalizations and new insights.
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For example, this research could help us find a solution of Jan Kraj´ıcˇek’s problem
to find a proof of the non-interpretability of the extension PC(A) of a consistent
finitely axiomatized sequential theory A with predicative comprehension in A itself
that does not run via the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
1.2. About the Proof. Our proof is roughly the result of combining a proof plan
due to Kreisel (see [Smo77]) with a proof plan due to Adamowic and Bigorajska
(see [AB01]).
I give two variants of the proof. The first avoids the use of the third Lo¨b condition
to wit that provability implies provability of provability. The second does use the
third Lo¨b condition. Since the two variants share a lot of text, I will represent the
first variant as the main line and I will give the additions for the second line in
typewriter font.
Remark 1.1. The ideal would be to study a new proof in a setting that is so
general that we do not have the resources to even prove things like the Go¨del Fixed
Point Lemma. We do not aspire to this ideal here. The theories studied all have
the resources to do diagonalization.
1.3. Prerequisites. The full proof presupposes some knowledge of relevant mate-
rials from the text books [HP93] and [Kay91]. For the benefit of the reader who is
not acquainted with weak theories we sketch the proof for the case of Peano Arith-
metic in Section 2. This special case has the advantage that almost all technical
complications disappear, while the essence of the proof-idea is still visible.
We will employ, for the full proof, the notations and conventions and elementary
facts of [Vis17a] to which the present paper is a sequel. We will use the Interpre-
tation Existence Lemma. For a careful exposition of this last result, see [Vis17b].
Finally, we will make use of a result from [Vis14].
2. The Second Incompleteness Theorem for Peano Arithmetic
We prove Second Incompleteness Theorem for Peano Arithmetic PA. Let the
standard axiomatization of PA be π. We write ✷πA for the arithmetization of the
provability of A from π and ✸πA := ¬✷π¬A for the consistency of (the theory
axiomatized by) π extended with A.
Theorem 2.1. PA 0 ✸π⊤.
We will use Tarski’s Theorem of the Undefinability of Truth for the case of PA.
Theorem 2.2. For any arithmetical formula A(x) (with only x free) the theory
PA+ {A(pBq)↔ B | B is an arithmetical sentence} is inconsistent.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 from Theorem 2.2. We assume Theorem 2.2. Suppose, in
order to arrive at a contradiction, that PA ⊢ ✸π⊤.
Let S be a maximal set of Σ01-sentences such that PA+ S is consistent. Let M be
a model of PA+ S.
We apply the Henkin Construction as described in e.g. [Fef60] (see also [Vis17b]),
to construct an internal Henkin model H(M) of PA based on ✸π⊤. We claim that
M and H(M) satisfy the same Σ01-sentences, to wit the Σ
0
1-sentences of S.
Consider any Σ01-sentence S and suppose M |= S. It is easily seen that H(M)
is an end-extension of M and, hence, H(M) |= S. [ By inspection of the Henkin
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construction, we find that PA ⊢ ✷πB → BH. So, since, by Σ01-completeness, we
have PA ⊢ S → ✷πS, we find PA ⊢ S → SH. Thus, it follows that H(M) |= S. ]
We may conclude that H(M) |= S. On the other hand, by the maximality of S,
the models M and H(M) cannot satisfy more Σ01-sentences than those in S.
Since, H(M) again will contain ✸π⊤ we can repeat the construction H to obtain
HH(M).
We claim that H(M) and HH(M) are elementary equivalent. The reason is as
follows. The Henkin construction is based on yes-no-decisions that depend on the
truth or falsity of Σ01-questions. On the standard level it, thus, depends on the truth
or falsity of Σ01-sentences. Since M and H(M) satisfy the same Σ
0
1-sentences we
find that, on standard levels, the same choices are made in the Henkin construction
and hence that H(M) and HH(M) are elementary equivalent.
The Henkin construction provides an internal truth-predicate H such that we
have PA ⊢ H(pBq)↔ BH. So we find:
H(M) |= B ⇔ HH(M) |= B
⇔ H(M) |= BH
⇔ H(M) |= H(pBq).
Thus, H(M) is a model of PA + {H(pBq) ↔ B | B is an arithmetical sentence}.
But this contradicts Theorem 2.2 on the undefinability of truth. ✷
We note that our construction effectively yields a ∆02-truth-predicate H such that
PA+{H(pBq)↔ B | B is an arithmetical sentence} is consistent, in case PA proves
its own consistency.
We also note that the proof works on the weaker assumption that PA+S ⊢ ✸π⊤.
So, it follows that ✷π⊥ is in any maximal set of Σ
0
1-sentences S such that PA + S
is consistent.
3. Statement of Two Theorems
In this section, we state both Second Incompleteness Theorem and Tarski’s The-
orem of the Undefinability of Truth in the general forms we consider in the present
paper.
3.1. Our Version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. We work with
S12 as our basic basic weak arithmetic. See [Bus86] or [HP93]. We use ✷σ for the
arithmetization of provability from axiom set σ and ✸σ for ¬✷σ¬.
We will prove the following version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose U is a recursively enumerable theory. Let σ be a Σ01-
formula [Σb1-formula ] that defines an axiom set of U in the standard model. Sup-
pose that N : U ✄ (S12 +✸σ⊤). Then U is inconsistent.
The basic idea of a version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem using interpre-
tations is due to Feferman [Fef60]. Of course, Feferman, around 1960, was thinking
of PA as base theory rather than S12.
The variant where σ is Σ01 is stronger than the one where σ is Σ
b
1. However,
there are easy arguments to reduce the Second Incompleteness Theorem for Σ01-
axiomatizations to the Second Incompleteness Theorem for Σb1-axiomatizations.
See [Vis17a].
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3.2. Our Version of Tarski’s Theorem. We employ the following version of
Tarski’s Theorem. Let Θ be a signature. Suppose N : U ✄ R, where R is the very
weak arithmetic introduced in [TMR53]. We take TBN,AΘ to be the set of all Tarski
biconditionals A(pBq)↔ B, for B a Θ-sentence and pBq an N -numeral.
Theorem 3.2. Let U be a theory of signature Θ. Suppose N : U ✄R and, for some
U -formula A, we have U ⊢ TBN,AΘ . Then, U is inconsistent.
We can reduce our version of Tarski’s Theorem to the following special case. This
reduction uses the recursion theorem, so since we want to exclude anything that
even smells of self-reference we, probably, have to exclude this reduction from our
main line of argument. This is a pity since it would have been nice to reduce
all instances of the Second Incompleteness Theorem to one single application of
self-reference.
Theorem 3.3. Let A be the signature of arithmetic extended with a fresh unary
predicate T. Then, R+ TBID,T
A
is inconsistent.
Here is our argument for the reduction of Theorem 3.2 to Theorem 3.3. Suppose
N : U ✄ R and U ⊢ TBN,AΘ . Let ν be the translation associated with N . We
interpret R + TBID,T
A
in U via the translation ν⋆ which is ν on the arithmetical
vocabulary and which is A(trν⋆(v)) on T. Here, trν⋆ is the arithmetization of the
function B 7→ Bν
⋆
. We evidently need the recursion theorem to make our definition
work.
4. The Henkin Construction
The main tool of our proof will be the Interpretation Existence Lemma. In this
section we state this lemma and collect the relevant facts around it.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose σ is a Σ01-formula that represents the axioms of U in
the standard model. We have H[σ] : (S12 + ✸σ⊤) ✄ U . Here H[σ] is the Henkin
interpretation that results from substituting σ in certain formulas with unary second-
order variable X that together make up the Henkin interpretation H[X ].
We have, inside S12 + ✸σ⊤, a truth predicate H[σ] for H[σ] that satisfies the
commutation conditions for H[σ] on a definable cut J[σ]. It follows that S12+✸σ⊤ ⊢
H[σ](pAq)↔ AH[σ].
For a proof of this result see [Vis17b] which also discusses the history of the result.
Let Σ01,1 be the class of formulas of the form ∃x∀y ≤ tx∃z S0(x, y, z, ~u), where S0
is ∆0. Inspection shows that provσ(x), where σ is Σ
0
1, can be written as a Σ
0
1,1-
formula. [ Inspection shows that provσ(x), where σ is Σ
b
1, can be written as a
∃Σb1-formula. This employs the Σ
b
1-collection (or: Σ
b
1-replacement) Principle.
See [Bus86, Theorem 14, p53]. ] We have the following insight.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose σ is a Σ01-formula [Σ
b
1-formula ] that represents the ax-
ioms of U in the standard model. Suppose N0 and N1 are models of S
1
2 + ✸σ⊤.
Suppose further that N0 and N1 are Σ01,1-elementary equivalent [ ∃Σ
b
1-elementary
equivalent ]. Then H[σ](N0) and H[σ](N1) are elementary equivalent.
Proof. Inspecting the Henkin construction, we see that it fully depends on Σ01,1-
decisions [ ∃Σb1-decisions ]. For standard formulas only the standard Σ
0
1,1-sentences
[ ∃Σb1-sentences ] true or false in our models are relevant. ✷
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Consider any theory U of signature Θ. Suppose the axiom set of U is represented
by σ in Σ01 [ in ∃Σ
b
1 ]. Let N : U ✄ (S
1
2+✸σ⊤). We write H for H[σ] and H for H[σ].
Theorem 4.3. Consider M |= U and suppose N(M) and NHN(M) are Σ01,1-
elementary equivalent [ ∃Σb1-elementary equivalent ]. Then HN(M) |= TB
N,HN
Θ .
Proof. From the assumptions of the theorem, we find, by Theorem 4.2, that HN(M)
and HNHN(M) are elementary equivalent. Hence:
HN(M) |= A⇔ HNHN(M) |= A
⇔ HN(M) |= AHN
⇔ HN(M) |= HN (pAq). ✷
[ Here is one final fact about the Henkin construction that we will use for the
second line in the main proof.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose σ is a Σ01-formula [Σ
b
1-formula ] that represents the axioms
of U in the standard model. Then we have S12 +✸σ⊤ ⊢ ✷σA→ H[σ](A).
The proof is by inspection of the Henkin construction. ]
5. The Proof
Theorem 4.3 tells us that, in order to to prove Theorem 3.1, it is sufficient to
provide a modelM of U so that NH[σ]N(M) is Σ01,1-elementary equivalent [ ∃Σ
b
1-
elementary equivalent ] with N(M).
For the first line, we use the following fact.
Theorem 5.1. We have:
S12 ✄loc,cut W := S
1
2 + {S → S
I | S ∈ Σ01,1 and I is a definable cut }.
Here ✄loc,cut is local interpretability on definable cuts. For a treatment of this
insight, see [Vis14].1
Suppose σ is a Σ01-formula that represents the axioms of U in the standard model.
Suppose N : U✄(S12+✸σ⊤). Since Π
0
1,1-formulas are downwards preserved to cuts,
we have (S12+✸σ⊤)✄loc,cut (W+✸σ⊤). It follows that U ✄loc (W+✸σ⊤). Since U
proves its own consistency with respect to N it follows that U is reflexive. Hence,
by the Orey-Ha´jek characterization, we find K : U ✄ (W + ✸σ⊤), for some K.
We note that the Orey-Ha´jek characterization is itself based on the Interpretation
Existence Lemma.
We now take S a maximal set of Σ01,1-sentences such that U + S
K is consistent.
Let M be a model of U + SK . Let J be a K-internally definable cut between
K(M) and KHK(M), where H := H[σ]. We have:
S ∈ S ⇒ K(M) |= S(1)
⇒ J |= S(2)
⇒ KHK(M) |= S(3)
Step (2) holds since K(M) |= W and the definition of J is K-internal. We have
Step (3), since Σ01,1-sentences are upwards preserved from cuts.
1The theory W is interpretable in an ω1-cut of the theory Peano Basso of [Vis14].
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By the maximality of S, it follows that S ∈ S iff K(M) |= S and S ∈ S iff
KHK(M) |= S. We may conclude that K(M) and KHK(M) are Σ01,1-elementary
equivalent. Thus, we have our desired result with K in the role of N .
[We treat the second line. Suppose σ is a Σb1-formula that represents the axioms
of U in the standard model. Suppose N : U ✄ (S12 +✸σ⊤). Let S be a maximal
set of ∃Σb1-sentences such that U + S
N is consistent. Let H := H[σ]. We have,
by verifiable ∃Σb1-completeness in S
1
2, for S ∈ S, that:
U + SN ⊢ ✷σS
N
⊢ SNH
Now letM be a model of U+SN . It follows that HN(M) |= SN . By maximality,
it follows that, for any S ∈ ∃Σb1, we have
N(M) |= S ⇔ s ∈ S and NHN(M) |= S ⇔ s ∈ S.
So we are done. ]
We note that the second line looks somewhat more efficient. However, the first line
avoids the more refined syntactic analysis that is the basis of the second line.
Open Question 5.2. Our argument is presented as a model-theoretic argument.
So, it is itself not obviously formalizable in a weak theory. However, it seems to me
that the models can be eliminated from the argument. They mainly function as a
heuristic tool. So, the question is how much resources do we need to internalize our
argument in a theory. Is S12 sufficient?
We note that, since Lo¨b’s Principle follows, in the classical case, from the Second
Incompleteness Theorem and since the Third Lo¨b Condition follows from Lo¨b’s
Principle, an internalized version of the first variant of our proof implies the Third
Lo¨b Condition.
A closely related question is whether our argument can be made constructive. This
seems, at first sight, rather hopeless because of the radically non-constructive char-
acter of the Henkin construction. However, one can reduce the question the Sec-
ond Incompleteness Theorem for constructive theories to the Second Incomplete-
ness Theorem for classical theories. Now if we can make the argument completely
theory-internal we would be there.
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